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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Hadden argued that the district court erred when it 
summarily dismissed three of the claims set forth in her petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in two separate criminal cases. One of the 
claims was that her attorney in her attempted murder case was ineffective for failing to 
request a continuance when she told him, prior to the sentencing hearing, that she was 
under the influence of a psychotropic medication that caused her to feel "drugged" and 
"very lethargic and foggy in [her] thinking." 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State responds to each of the three claims. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-10.) With respect to her claim concerning her attorney's 
failure to seek a continuance of her sentencing hearing until she was no longer under 
the influence of a psychotropic medication, the State argues, inter alia, that Ms. Hadden 
"has failed to show that her factual allegation ... rendered her incompetent to proceed" 
and that she has not "cited to any legal standard for a continuance that would have 
been met by such a factual claim." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the State's arguments concerning the 
sentencing hearing claim. While Ms. Hadden maintains that this Court should grant her 
relief with respect to the other two claims, she need not respond to the State's 
arguments concerning those claims, and instead relies on the arguments set forth in her 
Appellant's Brief. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Hadden's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference. 
2 
ISSUE 
Did Ms. Hadden's claim that her attorney was ineffective for failing to move for a 
continuance of her sentencing hearing upon being informed that she was under the 
influence of a psychotropic drug raise a genuine issue of material fact, necessitating an 
evidentiary hearing? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
Ms. Hadden's Claim That Her Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing To Move For A 
Continuance Of Her Sentencing Hearing Upon Being Informed That She Was Under 
The Influence Of A Psychotropic Drug Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact, 
Necessitating An Evidentiary Hearing 
In responding to Ms. Hadden's claim that she received ineffective assistance of 
counsel when her attorney, knowing that she was under the influence of a psychotropic 
drug at the time of her sentencing hearing, failed to move for a continuance of the 
hearing until she was competent to proceed, the State submits the following argument: 
A defendant is competent to proceed to sentencing if she has the "present 
ability to consult with [her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding" and has a "rational, as well as factual, understanding of 
the proceedings against [her]." State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, _, 271 
P.3d 712, 723 (2012) (quotations omitted). Hadden has failed to show 
that her factual allegation that "Efexor" made her "very lethargic and foggy 
in [her] thinking" (R., vol. II, p. 247) rendered her incompetent to proceed. 
Nor has she cited to any legal standard for a continuance that would have 
been met by such a factual claim. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9 (citing no legal 
standard for granting a motion for a continuance of a sentencing hearing).) 
Hadden has failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that this 
allegation fails to state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
because no motion to continue on the basis asserted by Hadden would 
have been granted and no prejudice from the lack of delay has been 
alleged. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8 (brackets in original).) 
The State's argument fails because it stems from a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the standard to be employed by a district court in determining 
whether to order summary dismissal of a post-conviction claim. It further fails because 
Ms. Hadden did establish that, by law, she could not have been sentenced when she 
was incompetent to proceed, therefore rendering the State's argument concerning a 
failure to cite to "any legal standard for a continuance" in such a circumstance 
unpersuasive. Finally, the State's claim that the district court's conclusion that it would 
4 
not have granted a continuance of the sentencing hearing demonstrates that 
Ms. Hadden failed to make a prima facie showing to satisfy prejudice prong set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), also fails. 
Ms. Hadden notes that the standard to be applied when deciding whether 
summary dismissal of a post-conviction claim is appropriate was correctly set forth in 
her Appellant's Brief as follows: "on review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief 
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court determines whether a genuine 
issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with 
any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party." (Appellant's Brief, p.6 (citing Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 
900, 903 (2007) (citations omitted)).) 
In light of this standard, Ms. Hadden notes that she submitted uncontested 
evidence that, at the time of her sentencing hearing, she was under the influence of a 
psychotropic drug prescribed to her following a recent "mental breakdown," which 
caused her to feel "very lethargic and foggy in [her] thinking," as a result of which she 
was "not thinking very clearly" during her sentencing hearing. She also established that 
she told her lawyer about the effects of the drug prior to the hearing, and her lawyer told 
her "not to worry about it" because "this was a sentencing hearing and it didn't make a 
difference." (R., p.247.) Furthermore, she presented passages from the sentencing 
hearing showing that she made no attempt to correct a statement erroneously attributed 
to her in the psychological evaluation and sat silently while the district court cited to that 
misstatement while pronouncing sentence, and argued that it could be reasonably 
inferred from her failure to object to the misstatement that she was not able to 
5 
participate meaningfully in her sentencing hearing as a result of her drugged condition. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11.) These uncontroverted facts and inferences, when taken in 
the light most favorable to Ms. Hadden, the non-moving party, established a genuine 
issue of material fact such that she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim. 
With respect to the State's argument that Ms. Hadden's claim should fail because 
she did not cite "to any legal standard for a continuance that would have been met by 
such a factual claim," she notes that she cited to both Idaho Code § 18-210, which 
provides, "No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to 
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, 
convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as such 
incapacity endures," I.C. § 18-210 (emphasis added), and State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 
53 (2003), in support of the proposition that conducting a sentencing hearing with a 
defendant who is incapable of understanding and meaningfully participating in such a 
hearing is improper. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) 
With respect to the State's argument that Ms. Hadden failed to establish that she 
was prejudiced by any deficient performance because the district court indicated that it 
would not have granted a continuance on the facts alleged, 1 she notes that this is not 
1 What the district court actually concluded was that "[tJo prevail it would be the burden 
of the defendant to prove that if the motion had been pursued it would have been 
granted." (R., p.267 (citing Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622 (2010)).) 
The actual standard announced in Schoger was whether the petitioner has 
shown "a reasonable probability that but for her attorney's deficient performance the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different." Schoger, 148 Idaho at 624 
(emphasis added). The holding in Schoger is consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court's holding in Strickland that, in order to prevail on the prejudice prong, 
the petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). The Strickland court also explained that 
6 
the standard to apply when assessing Strickland's prejudice prong. Rather, the Court in 
Strickland explained that a trial judge's testimony as to what he or she would have done 
absent the deficient performance "is irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 700. Therefore, the State's claim that the district court concluded that it would 
not have granted a continuance even if it had known of Ms. Hadden's drugged 
condition, is not relevant to a consideration of the prejudice prong and must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Hadden 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment of dismissal as 
to the three claims contained in her Appellant's Brief, and remand this matter to the 
district court for an evidentiary hearing on those claims. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2012. 
SPENCERJ.HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered 
the outcome of the case." Id. at 693. 
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